The SFCP is the heir to a philosophical
tradition started by Kant in the C18 and continued by
J.F.Fries in the C19 and Leonard Nelson and his followers in the C20.
This
tradition of Critical Philosophy is very much part of the European movement of
thought and action called the Enlightenment. Within this tradition, the
ideals of freedom and democracy with which the Enlightenment started were
gradually extended to embrace those of equality and social justice.
Central to the work of SFCP since its
foundation in 1940 is Kant’s synthesis of reason and experience. For us it
is a basic tenet that neither reason alone nor experience alone can further
human knowledge nor promote ethical conduct.
In the modern world many believe that
knowledge and truth are merely a matter of power and fashion and that ethical
issues are no more than a mere question of talk and taste.
SFCP rejects
relativism and ethical nihilism. We believe in the possibility of rational
knowledge and autonomous ethical behaviour at the level both of the individual
and of the community. This inspires our advocacy of engagement in public life.
As part of this engagement we particularly value the practice of modern and
developing Socratic Dialogue as reintroduced in the C20 by our founder, Leonard
Nelson. In such dialogues reflection on experience blends with critical
reasoning with the aim of reaching rational consensus as a guide to action.
Agreed by
Trustees at Meeting on 17.01.05
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Critical Philosophy
Attributed to
Immanuel Kant, the critical philosophy
movement sees the primary task of
philosophy as
criticism rather than justification of knowledge;
criticism, for Kant, meant judging as to the
possibilities of knowledge before advancing to knowledge
itself (from the Greek kritike (techne), or "art
of judgment"). The initial, and perhaps even sole task
of philosophers, according to this view, is not to
establish and demonstrate theories about reality, but
rather to subject all theories--including those about
philosophy itself--to critical review, and measure their
validity by how well they withstand criticism.
"Critical philosophy" is also used as just another
name for Kant's philosophy itself. Kant said that
philosophy's proper enquiry is not about what is out
there in reality, but rather about the character and
foundations of experience itself. We must first judge
how human reason works, and within what limits, so that
we can afterwards correctly apply it to sense experience
and determine whether it can be applied at all to
metaphysical objects.
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Jakob Friedrich Fries
The German philosopher Jakob Friedrich Fries
(1773-1843), interested in the phenomenon of the
mind, advanced psychological philosophy in the
direction of psychological empiricism.
Jakob Friedrich Fries, born in Barby, Saxony, on
Aug. 23, 1773, studied at Leipzig and Jena. He
became dozent at Jena in 1801, professor of
philosophy and elementary mathematics at
Heidelberg in 1805, and professor of philosophy
in 1814. In 1816 Fries accepted the chair of
theoretical philosophy at Jena.
Fries was one of the links in a chain which
gradually transformed psychology from
metaphysics to
empiricism, from philosophy to science. A
disciple of
Immanuel Kant, he did not agree with Kant on all
points but sought rather to
reshape and elaborate the principles of critical
philosophy. He was thus considered by some an
opponent of Kant. Perhaps "semi-Kantian" describes
him best, for the system which Fries developed was
really midway between that of Kant and that of the "commonsense"
school.
In his chief work, Neue oder psychologische
Kritik der Vernunft (1807; New Critique of
Reason), Fries tried to combine the teaching of Kant
with elements from Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi's
philosophy of faith, basing critical philosophy on
psychology and substituting self-observation for the
transcendental method. Fries maintained that
only that which is sense-perceived can be known and
that the principles of reason are immediately known
in consciousness. Kant had sought to prove the
principles of reason
a priori. Fries, however, contended that human
beings cannot know the supersensible, or
things-in-themselves. They are objects of faith
which satisfy the demands of the heart.
Like Kant, Fries discussed psychological facts
under the heading of anthropology, considering them
in the light of the customs of primitive peoples,
and empirically thinking of the mental processes
themselves as being the data that psychology had
best study. The modern reader can possibly make more
relevant sense of Fries by substituting
"phenomenological" for Fries's "anthropological."
In 1821 Fries published the Handbook of
Psychical Anthropology, in which he divided
anthropology into mental and physical aspects. Under
mental anthropology he studied the actual processes
by which one perceives, remembers, and thinks. The
mental processes, although depending upon a pure ego
or self, are never known except through their
effects. Similarly, the ego or self cannot be
appreciated for itself but is known only through its
effects. Under physical anthropology Fries discussed
the relationship between brain and mind. He
distinguished three main faculties: knowledge, inner
disposition (Gemüth) or feeling, and
activity or will. He regarded each of these
faculties as incorporated in or subordinated to the
unitary self.
Further Reading
Virtually all of the important sources on Fries
are in German. One of the few works in translation
is Rudolf Otto, The Philosophy of Religion Based
on Kant and Fries (1921; trans. 1931). For
background material see George Sidney Brett,
Brett's History of Psychology, edited and
abridged by R. S. Peters (1953).
Article on J.F.Fries in Any Answers
July 2007 |